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Breakdown 009 — Consumer tech · Quick commerce

Zepto

10-minute grocery delivery at a scale no one thought was possible in India — growing revenue 2.5x in a year while losses grow even faster.

FY25 revenue ₹9,669 Cr (+129% YoY)FY25 net loss ₹3,367 Cr (+177% YoY)Valued at $5B+; redomiciled from Singapore to India ahead of a targeted IPO

What it is

Founded in 2021 by Aadit Palicha and Kaivalya Vohra, Zepto is a quick-commerce app promising grocery and daily-essentials delivery in around 10 minutes, built on a network of dark stores stocked and positioned close to dense urban demand. It competes directly with Blinkit (Eternal) and Swiggy Instamart in India’s fast-expanding instant-delivery category, and moved its domicile from Singapore to India in January 2025 ahead of a planned IPO.

Business model

Zepto owns and operates micro-fulfillment “dark stores” rather than relying purely on marketplace logistics, which gives it tighter control over SKU selection and delivery times but means it carries real estate, inventory, and last-mile delivery costs directly. Revenue comes from product margins on groceries and daily essentials, delivery and platform fees charged to customers, and advertising/promoted-placement revenue from brands wanting shelf space in Zepto’s app — the same three-legged model as Blinkit and Instamart, where the real question is never the revenue mix but whether unit economics per dark store ever turn positive at scale.

Core user flow

Open the app → browse a curated, hyperlocal SKU catalog → order groceries or daily essentials → receive delivery from the nearest dark store in roughly 10 minutes → repeat often enough that quick commerce replaces a chunk of routine grocery shopping entirely.

What’s working

What I’d change

Bet: losses are growing faster than revenue — FY25’s net loss widened 177% to ₹3,367 crore against 129% revenue growth — which means each incremental rupee of sales is now costing Zepto more to acquire than the rupee before it, the opposite of the trend a quick-commerce company needs heading into an IPO. The company itself attributes this to “expanding delivery networks, customer incentives, and operational investments,” which is another way of saying growth is still being bought, not earned. I’d push hard to segment dark-store-level unit economics publicly (or at least internally drive decisions by it) and start deliberately slowing expansion into the weakest-performing cohort of stores, rather than let blended company-wide growth numbers mask which stores are actually profitable and which are pure cash burn.

Metric to track: contribution margin per dark store (revenue minus direct delivery, inventory shrinkage, and store opex), split between stores older than 12 months and newer cohorts. If mature stores aren’t trending toward profitability even as new ones keep opening at a loss, the growth-first strategy is delaying the hard problem rather than solving it — a bad look heading into public-market scrutiny.

One number

Zepto’s FY25 net loss widened 177% year-over-year to ₹3,367 crore even as revenue grew 129% to ₹9,669 crore — a reminder that in quick commerce, faster top-line growth doesn’t yet mean the unit economics are catching up.

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